Connectionists: Physics and Psychology (and the C-word)

Carson Chow ccchow at pitt.edu
Tue Jan 28 16:19:31 EST 2014


Actually, we don't know if BQP is contained in NP so maybe there is hope 
for QM after all.


On 1/28/14 4:01 PM, Carson Chow wrote:
> Brian,
>
> Quantum mechanics can be completely simulated on a classical computer 
> so if quantum mechanics do matter for C then it must be a matter of 
> computational efficiency and nothing more.  We also know that BQP 
> (i.e. set of problems solved efficiently on a quantum computer) is 
> bigger than BPP (set of problems solved effficiently on a classical 
> computer) but not by much.  I'm not fully up to date on this but I 
> think factoring and boson sampling or about the only two examples that 
> are in BQP and not in BPP.  We also know that BPP is much smaller than 
> NP, so if C does require QM then for some reason it sits in a small 
> sliver of complexity space.
>
> best,
> Carson
>
> PS I do like your self-consistent test for confirming consciousness. I 
> once proposed that we could just run Turing machines and see which 
> ones asked why they exist as a test of C.  Kind of similar to your idea.
>
>
> On 1/28/14 3:09 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
>> Hi Richard, thanks for the feedback.
>>
>> > Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates with C 
>> ... that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous meaning for C 
>> itself (which I don't think anyone has, so therefore it is, after 
>> all, of no value to look for outcome measures that correlate)
>>
>> Actually, the outcome measure I described is independent of a clear 
>> and unambiguous meaning for C itself, and in an interesting way: the 
>> models, like us, essentially reinvent the entire literature, and have 
>> a conversation as we do, inventing almost all the same positions that 
>> we've invented (including the one in your paper).
>>
>> I will read your paper and see if it changes my position. At the 
>> present time, however, I can't imagine any information that would 
>> solve the so-called zombie problem. I'm not a big fan of integrative 
>> information theory - I don't think hydrogen atoms are conscious, and 
>> I don't think naive bayes trained on a large corpus and run in 
>> generative mode is conscious. Thus, if the model doesn't go through 
>> the same philosophical reasoning that we've collectively gone through 
>> with regards to subjective experience, then I'm going to wonder if 
>> its experience is anything like mine at all.
>>
>> Touching back on QM, if we create a point neuron-based model that 
>> doesn't wax philosophical on consciousness, I'm going to wonder if we 
>> should add lower levels of analysis.
>>
>> I will take a look at your paper, and see if it changes my view on 
>> this at all.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Brian Mingus
>>
>> http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 12:05 PM, Richard Loosemore 
>> <rloosemore at susaro.com <mailto:rloosemore at susaro.com>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>     Brian,
>>
>>     Everything hinges on the definition of the concept
>>     ("consciousness") under consideration.
>>
>>     In the chapter I wrote in Wang & Goertzel's "Theoretical
>>     Foundations of Artificial General Intelligence" I pointed out
>>     (echoing Chalmers) that too much is said about C without a clear
>>     enough understanding of what is meant by it .... and then I went
>>     on to clarify what exactly could be meant by it, and thereby came
>>     to a resolution of the problem (with testable predictions).   So
>>     I think the answer to the question you pose below is that:
>>
>>     (a) Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates
>>     with C ... that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous
>>     meaning for C itself (which I don't think anyone has, so
>>     therefore it is, after all, of no value to look for outcome
>>     measures that correlate), and
>>
>>     (b) All three of the approaches you mention are sidelined and
>>     finessed by the approach I used in the abovementioned paper,
>>     where I clarify the definition by clarifying first why we have so
>>     much difficulty defining it.  In other words, there is a fourth
>>     way, and that is to explain it as ... well, I have to leave that
>>     dangling because there is too much subtlety to pack into an
>>     elevator pitch.  (The title is the best I can do:  " Human and
>>     Machine Consciousness as a Boundary Effect in the Concept
>>     Analysis Mechanism ").
>>
>>     Certainly though, the weakness of all quantum mechanics 'answers'
>>     is that they are stranded on the wrong side of the explanatory gap.
>>
>>
>>     Richard Loosemore
>>
>>
>>     Reference
>>     Loosemore, R.P.W. (2012).  Human and Machine Consciousness as a
>>     Boundary Effect in the Concept Analysis Mechanism.  In: P. Wang &
>>     B. Goertzel (Eds), Theoretical Foundations of Artifical General
>>     Intelligence.  Atlantis Press.
>>     http://richardloosemore.com/docs/2012a_Consciousness_rpwl.pdf
>>
>>
>>
>>     On 1/28/14, 10:34 AM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
>>>     Hi Richard,
>>>
>>>     > I can tell you that the quantum story isn't nearly enough
>>>     clear in the minds of physicists, yet, so how it can be applied
>>>     to the C question is beyond me.  Frankly, it does NOT apply:
>>>      saying anything about observers and entanglement does not at
>>>     any point touch the kind of statements that involve talk about
>>>     qualia etc.
>>>
>>>     I'm not sure I see the argument you're trying to make here. If
>>>     you have an outcome measure that you agree correlates with
>>>     consciousness, then we have a framework for scientifically
>>>     studying it.
>>>
>>>     Here's my setup: If you create a society of models and do not
>>>     expose them to a corpus containing consciousness philosophy and
>>>     they then, in a reasonably short amount of time, independently
>>>     rewrite it, they are almost certainly conscious. This design
>>>     explicitly rules out a generative model that accidentally spits
>>>     out consciousness philosophy.
>>>
>>>     Another approach is to accept that our brains are so similar
>>>     that you and I are almost certainly both conscious, and to then
>>>     perform experiments on each other and study our subjective reports.
>>>
>>>     Another approach is to perform experiments on your own brain and
>>>     to write first person reports about your experience.
>>>
>>>     These three approaches each have tradeoffs, and each provide
>>>     unique information. The first approach, in particular, might
>>>     ultimately allow us to draw some of the strongest possible
>>>     conclusions. For example, it allows for the scientific study of
>>>     the extent to which quantum effects may or may not be relevant.
>>>
>>>     I'm very interested in hearing any counterarguments as to why
>>>     this general approach won't work. If it /can't/ work, then I
>>>     would argue that perhaps we should not create full models of
>>>     ourselves, but should instead focus on upgrading ourselves. From
>>>     that perspective, getting this to work is extremely important,
>>>     despite however futuristic it may seem.
>>>
>>>     > So let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).
>>>
>>>     Not gonna' happen. :)
>>>
>>>     Brian Mingus
>>>     http://grey.colorado.edu
>>>
>>>     On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 7:32 AM, Richard Loosemore
>>>     <rloosemore at susaro.com <mailto:rloosemore at susaro.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>         On 1/27/14, 11:30 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
>>>
>>>             Consciousness is also such a bag of worms that we can't
>>>             rule out that qualia owes its totally non-obvious and a
>>>             priori unpredicted existence to concepts derived from
>>>             quantum mechanics, such as nested observers, or
>>>             entanglement.
>>>
>>>             As far as I know, my litmus test for a model is the only
>>>             way to tell whether low-level quantum effects are
>>>             required: if the model, which has not been exposed to a
>>>             corpus containing consciousness philosophy, then goes on
>>>             to independently recreate consciousness philosophy,
>>>             despite the fact that it is composed of (for example)
>>>             point neurons, then we can be sure that low-level
>>>             quantum mechanical details are not important.
>>>
>>>             Note, however, that such a model might still rely on
>>>             nested observers or entanglement. I'll let a quantum
>>>             physicist chime in on that - although I will note that
>>>             according to news articles I've read that we keep
>>>             managing to entangle larger and larger objects - up to
>>>             the size of molecules at this time, IIRC.
>>>
>>>
>>>             Brian Mingus
>>>             http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus
>>>
>>>         Speaking as someone is both a physicist and a cognitive
>>>         scientist, AND someone who has written papers resolving that
>>>         whole C-word issue, I can tell you that the quantum story
>>>         isn't nearly enough clear in the minds of physicists, yet,
>>>         so how it can be applied to the C question is beyond me.
>>>          Frankly, it does NOT apply:  saying anything about
>>>         observers and entanglement does not at any point touch the
>>>         kind of statements that involve talk about qualia etc.   So
>>>         let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).
>>>
>>>         As for using the methods/standards of physics over here in
>>>         cog sci ..... I think it best to listen to George Bernard
>>>         Shaw on this one:  "Never do unto others as you would they
>>>         do unto you:  their tastes may not be the same."
>>>
>>>         Our tastes (requirements/constraints/issues) are quite
>>>         different, so what happens elsewhere cannot be directly,
>>>         slavishly imported.
>>>
>>>
>>>         Richard Loosemore
>>>
>>>         Wells College
>>>         Aurora NY
>>>         USA
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>

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