Connectionists: Physics and Psychology (and the C-word)
Carson Chow
ccchow at pitt.edu
Tue Jan 28 16:19:31 EST 2014
Actually, we don't know if BQP is contained in NP so maybe there is hope
for QM after all.
On 1/28/14 4:01 PM, Carson Chow wrote:
> Brian,
>
> Quantum mechanics can be completely simulated on a classical computer
> so if quantum mechanics do matter for C then it must be a matter of
> computational efficiency and nothing more. We also know that BQP
> (i.e. set of problems solved efficiently on a quantum computer) is
> bigger than BPP (set of problems solved effficiently on a classical
> computer) but not by much. I'm not fully up to date on this but I
> think factoring and boson sampling or about the only two examples that
> are in BQP and not in BPP. We also know that BPP is much smaller than
> NP, so if C does require QM then for some reason it sits in a small
> sliver of complexity space.
>
> best,
> Carson
>
> PS I do like your self-consistent test for confirming consciousness. I
> once proposed that we could just run Turing machines and see which
> ones asked why they exist as a test of C. Kind of similar to your idea.
>
>
> On 1/28/14 3:09 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
>> Hi Richard, thanks for the feedback.
>>
>> > Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates with C
>> ... that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous meaning for C
>> itself (which I don't think anyone has, so therefore it is, after
>> all, of no value to look for outcome measures that correlate)
>>
>> Actually, the outcome measure I described is independent of a clear
>> and unambiguous meaning for C itself, and in an interesting way: the
>> models, like us, essentially reinvent the entire literature, and have
>> a conversation as we do, inventing almost all the same positions that
>> we've invented (including the one in your paper).
>>
>> I will read your paper and see if it changes my position. At the
>> present time, however, I can't imagine any information that would
>> solve the so-called zombie problem. I'm not a big fan of integrative
>> information theory - I don't think hydrogen atoms are conscious, and
>> I don't think naive bayes trained on a large corpus and run in
>> generative mode is conscious. Thus, if the model doesn't go through
>> the same philosophical reasoning that we've collectively gone through
>> with regards to subjective experience, then I'm going to wonder if
>> its experience is anything like mine at all.
>>
>> Touching back on QM, if we create a point neuron-based model that
>> doesn't wax philosophical on consciousness, I'm going to wonder if we
>> should add lower levels of analysis.
>>
>> I will take a look at your paper, and see if it changes my view on
>> this at all.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Brian Mingus
>>
>> http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 12:05 PM, Richard Loosemore
>> <rloosemore at susaro.com <mailto:rloosemore at susaro.com>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Brian,
>>
>> Everything hinges on the definition of the concept
>> ("consciousness") under consideration.
>>
>> In the chapter I wrote in Wang & Goertzel's "Theoretical
>> Foundations of Artificial General Intelligence" I pointed out
>> (echoing Chalmers) that too much is said about C without a clear
>> enough understanding of what is meant by it .... and then I went
>> on to clarify what exactly could be meant by it, and thereby came
>> to a resolution of the problem (with testable predictions). So
>> I think the answer to the question you pose below is that:
>>
>> (a) Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates
>> with C ... that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous
>> meaning for C itself (which I don't think anyone has, so
>> therefore it is, after all, of no value to look for outcome
>> measures that correlate), and
>>
>> (b) All three of the approaches you mention are sidelined and
>> finessed by the approach I used in the abovementioned paper,
>> where I clarify the definition by clarifying first why we have so
>> much difficulty defining it. In other words, there is a fourth
>> way, and that is to explain it as ... well, I have to leave that
>> dangling because there is too much subtlety to pack into an
>> elevator pitch. (The title is the best I can do: " Human and
>> Machine Consciousness as a Boundary Effect in the Concept
>> Analysis Mechanism ").
>>
>> Certainly though, the weakness of all quantum mechanics 'answers'
>> is that they are stranded on the wrong side of the explanatory gap.
>>
>>
>> Richard Loosemore
>>
>>
>> Reference
>> Loosemore, R.P.W. (2012). Human and Machine Consciousness as a
>> Boundary Effect in the Concept Analysis Mechanism. In: P. Wang &
>> B. Goertzel (Eds), Theoretical Foundations of Artifical General
>> Intelligence. Atlantis Press.
>> http://richardloosemore.com/docs/2012a_Consciousness_rpwl.pdf
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/28/14, 10:34 AM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
>>> Hi Richard,
>>>
>>> > I can tell you that the quantum story isn't nearly enough
>>> clear in the minds of physicists, yet, so how it can be applied
>>> to the C question is beyond me. Frankly, it does NOT apply:
>>> saying anything about observers and entanglement does not at
>>> any point touch the kind of statements that involve talk about
>>> qualia etc.
>>>
>>> I'm not sure I see the argument you're trying to make here. If
>>> you have an outcome measure that you agree correlates with
>>> consciousness, then we have a framework for scientifically
>>> studying it.
>>>
>>> Here's my setup: If you create a society of models and do not
>>> expose them to a corpus containing consciousness philosophy and
>>> they then, in a reasonably short amount of time, independently
>>> rewrite it, they are almost certainly conscious. This design
>>> explicitly rules out a generative model that accidentally spits
>>> out consciousness philosophy.
>>>
>>> Another approach is to accept that our brains are so similar
>>> that you and I are almost certainly both conscious, and to then
>>> perform experiments on each other and study our subjective reports.
>>>
>>> Another approach is to perform experiments on your own brain and
>>> to write first person reports about your experience.
>>>
>>> These three approaches each have tradeoffs, and each provide
>>> unique information. The first approach, in particular, might
>>> ultimately allow us to draw some of the strongest possible
>>> conclusions. For example, it allows for the scientific study of
>>> the extent to which quantum effects may or may not be relevant.
>>>
>>> I'm very interested in hearing any counterarguments as to why
>>> this general approach won't work. If it /can't/ work, then I
>>> would argue that perhaps we should not create full models of
>>> ourselves, but should instead focus on upgrading ourselves. From
>>> that perspective, getting this to work is extremely important,
>>> despite however futuristic it may seem.
>>>
>>> > So let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).
>>>
>>> Not gonna' happen. :)
>>>
>>> Brian Mingus
>>> http://grey.colorado.edu
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 7:32 AM, Richard Loosemore
>>> <rloosemore at susaro.com <mailto:rloosemore at susaro.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 1/27/14, 11:30 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
>>>
>>> Consciousness is also such a bag of worms that we can't
>>> rule out that qualia owes its totally non-obvious and a
>>> priori unpredicted existence to concepts derived from
>>> quantum mechanics, such as nested observers, or
>>> entanglement.
>>>
>>> As far as I know, my litmus test for a model is the only
>>> way to tell whether low-level quantum effects are
>>> required: if the model, which has not been exposed to a
>>> corpus containing consciousness philosophy, then goes on
>>> to independently recreate consciousness philosophy,
>>> despite the fact that it is composed of (for example)
>>> point neurons, then we can be sure that low-level
>>> quantum mechanical details are not important.
>>>
>>> Note, however, that such a model might still rely on
>>> nested observers or entanglement. I'll let a quantum
>>> physicist chime in on that - although I will note that
>>> according to news articles I've read that we keep
>>> managing to entangle larger and larger objects - up to
>>> the size of molecules at this time, IIRC.
>>>
>>>
>>> Brian Mingus
>>> http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus
>>>
>>> Speaking as someone is both a physicist and a cognitive
>>> scientist, AND someone who has written papers resolving that
>>> whole C-word issue, I can tell you that the quantum story
>>> isn't nearly enough clear in the minds of physicists, yet,
>>> so how it can be applied to the C question is beyond me.
>>> Frankly, it does NOT apply: saying anything about
>>> observers and entanglement does not at any point touch the
>>> kind of statements that involve talk about qualia etc. So
>>> let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).
>>>
>>> As for using the methods/standards of physics over here in
>>> cog sci ..... I think it best to listen to George Bernard
>>> Shaw on this one: "Never do unto others as you would they
>>> do unto you: their tastes may not be the same."
>>>
>>> Our tastes (requirements/constraints/issues) are quite
>>> different, so what happens elsewhere cannot be directly,
>>> slavishly imported.
>>>
>>>
>>> Richard Loosemore
>>>
>>> Wells College
>>> Aurora NY
>>> USA
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>
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