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<font face="Times New Roman, Times, serif">Actually, we don't know
if BQP is contained in NP so maybe there is hope for QM after all.<br>
<br>
<br>
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/28/14 4:01 PM, Carson Chow wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:52E81A9C.2080303@pitt.edu" type="cite">
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<font face="Times New Roman, Times, serif">Brian,<br>
<br>
Quantum mechanics can be completely simulated on a classical
computer so if quantum mechanics do matter for C then it must be
a matter of computational efficiency and nothing more. We also
know that BQP (i.e. set of problems solved efficiently on a
quantum computer) is bigger than BPP (set of problems solved
effficiently on a classical computer) but not by much. I'm not
fully up to date on this but I think factoring and boson
sampling or about the only two examples that are in BQP and not
in BPP. We also know that BPP is much smaller than NP, so if C
does require QM then for some reason it sits in a small sliver
of complexity space.<br>
<br>
best,<br>
Carson<br>
<br>
PS I do like your self-consistent test for confirming
consciousness. I once proposed that we could just run Turing
machines and see which ones asked why they exist as a test of
C. Kind of similar to your idea.<br>
<br>
<br>
</font>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/28/14 3:09 PM, Brian J Mingus
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAJ=QoBSJ_=GQr=8cPg8Jo9wmtCLR7qs6Gy94cdghspRaHG0S1Q@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Hi Richard, thanks for the feedback.
<div><br>
</div>
<div><span
style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px">>
Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates
with C ... that is good, but only with a clear and
unambigous meaning for C itself (which I don't think
anyone has, so therefore it is, after all, of no value to
look for outcome measures that correlate)</span><br>
</div>
<div><span
style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><font face="arial, sans-serif">Actually, the outcome
measure I described is independent of a clear and
unambiguous meaning for C itself, and in an interesting
way: the models, like us, essentially reinvent the entire
literature, and have a conversation as we do, inventing
almost all the same positions that we've invented
(including the one in your paper). </font></div>
<div><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div>I will read your paper and see if it changes my position.
At the present time, however, I can't imagine any
information that would solve the so-called zombie problem.
I'm not a big fan of integrative information theory - I
don't think hydrogen atoms are conscious, and I don't think
naive bayes trained on a large corpus and run in generative
mode is conscious. Thus, if the model doesn't go through the
same philosophical reasoning that we've collectively gone
through with regards to subjective experience, then I'm
going to wonder if its experience is anything like mine at
all.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Touching back on QM, if we create a point neuron-based
model that doesn't wax philosophical on consciousness, I'm
going to wonder if we should add lower levels of analysis.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I will take a look at your paper, and see if it changes
my view on this at all.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Cheers,</div>
<div><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div><font face="arial, sans-serif">Brian Mingus</font></div>
<div><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div><font face="arial, sans-serif"><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus" target="_blank">http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus</a></font></div>
<div><span
style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px"><br>
</span></div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 12:05 PM,
Richard Loosemore <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:rloosemore@susaro.com" target="_blank">rloosemore@susaro.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> <br>
<br>
Brian,<br>
<br>
Everything hinges on the definition of the concept
("consciousness") under consideration.<br>
<br>
In the chapter I wrote in Wang & Goertzel's
"Theoretical Foundations of Artificial General
Intelligence" I pointed out (echoing Chalmers) that
too much is said about C without a clear enough
understanding of what is meant by it .... and then I
went on to clarify what exactly could be meant by it,
and thereby came to a resolution of the problem (with
testable predictions). So I think the answer to the
question you pose below is that:<br>
<br>
(a) Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that
correlates with C ... that is good, but only with a
clear and unambigous meaning for C itself (which I
don't think anyone has, so therefore it is, after all,
of no value to look for outcome measures that
correlate), and <br>
<br>
(b) All three of the approaches you mention are
sidelined and finessed by the approach I used in the
abovementioned paper, where I clarify the definition
by clarifying first why we have so much difficulty
defining it. In other words, there is a fourth way,
and that is to explain it as ... well, I have to leave
that dangling because there is too much subtlety to
pack into an elevator pitch. (The title is the best I
can do: " Human and Machine Consciousness as a
Boundary Effect in the Concept Analysis Mechanism ").<br>
<br>
Certainly though, the weakness of all quantum
mechanics 'answers' is that they are stranded on the
wrong side of the explanatory gap.<br>
<br>
<br>
Richard Loosemore<br>
<br>
<br>
Reference<br>
Loosemore, R.P.W. (2012). Human and Machine
Consciousness as a Boundary Effect in the Concept
Analysis Mechanism. In: P. Wang & B. Goertzel
(Eds), Theoretical Foundations of Artifical General
Intelligence. Atlantis Press.<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://richardloosemore.com/docs/2012a_Consciousness_rpwl.pdf"
target="_blank">http://richardloosemore.com/docs/2012a_Consciousness_rpwl.pdf</a>
<div>
<div><br>
<br>
<br>
On 1/28/14, 10:34 AM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_extra">Hi Richard,</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">> I can tell you
that the quantum story isn't nearly enough
clear in the minds of physicists, yet, so
how it can be applied to the C question is
beyond me. Frankly, it does NOT apply:
saying anything about observers and
entanglement does not at any point touch the
kind of statements that involve talk about
qualia etc.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">I'm not sure I see
the argument you're trying to make here. If
you have an outcome measure that you agree
correlates with consciousness, then we have
a framework for scientifically studying it. </div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">Here's my setup: If
you create a society of models and do not
expose them to a corpus containing
consciousness philosophy and they then, in a
reasonably short amount of time,
independently rewrite it, they are almost
certainly conscious. This design explicitly
rules out a generative model that
accidentally spits out consciousness
philosophy.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">Another approach is
to accept that our brains are so similar
that you and I are almost certainly both
conscious, and to then perform experiments
on each other and study our subjective
reports.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">Another approach is
to perform experiments on your own brain and
to write first person reports about your
experience.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"> These three
approaches each have tradeoffs, and each
provide unique information. The first
approach, in particular, might ultimately
allow us to draw some of the strongest
possible conclusions. For example, it allows
for the scientific study of the extent to
which quantum effects may or may not be
relevant.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">I'm very interested
in hearing any counterarguments as to why
this general approach won't work. If it <i>can't</i> work,
then I would argue that perhaps we should
not create full models of ourselves, but
should instead focus on upgrading ourselves.
From that perspective, getting this to work
is extremely important, despite however
futuristic it may seem.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">> <span
style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px">So
let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).</span></div>
<div class="gmail_extra"> <span
style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px"><br>
</span></div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><span
style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px">Not
gonna' happen. :)</span></div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">Brian Mingus</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://grey.colorado.edu"
target="_blank">http://grey.colorado.edu</a></div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote"> On Tue, Jan 28,
2014 at 7:32 AM, Richard Loosemore <span
dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:rloosemore@susaro.com"
target="_blank">rloosemore@susaro.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">On
1/27/14, 11:30 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
Consciousness is also such a bag of
worms that we can't rule out that
qualia owes its totally non-obvious
and a priori unpredicted existence to
concepts derived from quantum
mechanics, such as nested observers,
or entanglement.<br>
<br>
As far as I know, my litmus test for a
model is the only way to tell whether
low-level quantum effects are
required: if the model, which has not
been exposed to a corpus containing
consciousness philosophy, then goes on
to independently recreate
consciousness philosophy, despite the
fact that it is composed of (for
example) point neurons, then we can be
sure that low-level quantum mechanical
details are not important.<br>
<br>
Note, however, that such a model might
still rely on nested observers or
entanglement. I'll let a quantum
physicist chime in on that - although
I will note that according to news
articles I've read that we keep
managing to entangle larger and larger
objects - up to the size of molecules
at this time, IIRC.<br>
<br>
<br>
Brian Mingus<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus"
target="_blank">http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
Speaking as someone is both a physicist
and a cognitive scientist, AND someone
who has written papers resolving that
whole C-word issue, I can tell you that
the quantum story isn't nearly enough
clear in the minds of physicists, yet,
so how it can be applied to the C
question is beyond me. Frankly, it does
NOT apply: saying anything about
observers and entanglement does not at
any point touch the kind of statements
that involve talk about qualia etc. So
let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).<br>
<br>
As for using the methods/standards of
physics over here in cog sci ..... I
think it best to listen to George
Bernard Shaw on this one: "Never do
unto others as you would they do unto
you: their tastes may not be the same."<br>
<br>
Our tastes
(requirements/constraints/issues) are
quite different, so what happens
elsewhere cannot be directly, slavishly
imported.<br>
<br>
<br>
Richard Loosemore<br>
<br>
Wells College<br>
Aurora NY<br>
USA<br>
<br>
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