Connectionists: Physics and Psychology (and the C-word)

[Carson Chow]

Brian,

Quantum mechanics can be completely simulated on a classical computer so 
if quantum mechanics do matter for C then it must be a matter of 
computational efficiency and nothing more.  We also know that BQP (i.e. 
set of problems solved efficiently on a quantum computer) is bigger than 
BPP (set of problems solved effficiently on a classical computer) but 
not by much.  I'm not fully up to date on this but I think factoring and 
boson sampling or about the only two examples that are in BQP and not in 
BPP.  We also know that BPP is much smaller than NP, so if C does 
require QM then for some reason it sits in a small sliver of complexity 
space.

best,
Carson

PS I do like your self-consistent test for confirming consciousness. I 
once proposed that we could just run Turing machines and see which ones 
asked why they exist as a test of C. Kind of similar to your idea.


On 1/28/14 3:09 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
> Hi Richard, thanks for the feedback.
>
> > Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates with C ... 
> that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous meaning for C 
> itself (which I don't think anyone has, so therefore it is, after all, 
> of no value to look for outcome measures that correlate)
>
> Actually, the outcome measure I described is independent of a clear 
> and unambiguous meaning for C itself, and in an interesting way: the 
> models, like us, essentially reinvent the entire literature, and have 
> a conversation as we do, inventing almost all the same positions that 
> we've invented (including the one in your paper).
>
> I will read your paper and see if it changes my position. At the 
> present time, however, I can't imagine any information that would 
> solve the so-called zombie problem. I'm not a big fan of integrative 
> information theory - I don't think hydrogen atoms are conscious, and I 
> don't think naive bayes trained on a large corpus and run in 
> generative mode is conscious. Thus, if the model doesn't go through 
> the same philosophical reasoning that we've collectively gone through 
> with regards to subjective experience, then I'm going to wonder if its 
> experience is anything like mine at all.
>
> Touching back on QM, if we create a point neuron-based model that 
> doesn't wax philosophical on consciousness, I'm going to wonder if we 
> should add lower levels of analysis.
>
> I will take a look at your paper, and see if it changes my view on 
> this at all.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Brian Mingus
>
> http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 12:05 PM, Richard Loosemore 
> <rloosemore at susaro.com <mailto:rloosemore at susaro.com>> wrote:
>
>
>
>     Brian,
>
>     Everything hinges on the definition of the concept
>     ("consciousness") under consideration.
>
>     In the chapter I wrote in Wang & Goertzel's "Theoretical
>     Foundations of Artificial General Intelligence" I pointed out
>     (echoing Chalmers) that too much is said about C without a clear
>     enough understanding of what is meant by it .... and then I went
>     on to clarify what exactly could be meant by it, and thereby came
>     to a resolution of the problem (with testable predictions).   So I
>     think the answer to the question you pose below is that:
>
>     (a) Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates
>     with C ... that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous
>     meaning for C itself (which I don't think anyone has, so therefore
>     it is, after all, of no value to look for outcome measures that
>     correlate), and
>
>     (b) All three of the approaches you mention are sidelined and
>     finessed by the approach I used in the abovementioned paper, where
>     I clarify the definition by clarifying first why we have so much
>     difficulty defining it.  In other words, there is a fourth way,
>     and that is to explain it as ... well, I have to leave that
>     dangling because there is too much subtlety to pack into an
>     elevator pitch.  (The title is the best I can do:  " Human and
>     Machine Consciousness as a Boundary Effect in the Concept Analysis
>     Mechanism ").
>
>     Certainly though, the weakness of all quantum mechanics 'answers'
>     is that they are stranded on the wrong side of the explanatory gap.
>
>
>     Richard Loosemore
>
>
>     Reference
>     Loosemore, R.P.W. (2012).  Human and Machine Consciousness as a
>     Boundary Effect in the Concept Analysis Mechanism.  In: P. Wang &
>     B. Goertzel (Eds), Theoretical Foundations of Artifical General
>     Intelligence.  Atlantis Press.
>     http://richardloosemore.com/docs/2012a_Consciousness_rpwl.pdf
>
>
>
>     On 1/28/14, 10:34 AM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
>>     Hi Richard,
>>
>>     > I can tell you that the quantum story isn't nearly enough clear
>>     in the minds of physicists, yet, so how it can be applied to the
>>     C question is beyond me.  Frankly, it does NOT apply:  saying
>>     anything about observers and entanglement does not at any point
>>     touch the kind of statements that involve talk about qualia etc.
>>
>>     I'm not sure I see the argument you're trying to make here. If
>>     you have an outcome measure that you agree correlates with
>>     consciousness, then we have a framework for scientifically
>>     studying it.
>>
>>     Here's my setup: If you create a society of models and do not
>>     expose them to a corpus containing consciousness philosophy and
>>     they then, in a reasonably short amount of time, independently
>>     rewrite it, they are almost certainly conscious. This design
>>     explicitly rules out a generative model that accidentally spits
>>     out consciousness philosophy.
>>
>>     Another approach is to accept that our brains are so similar that
>>     you and I are almost certainly both conscious, and to then
>>     perform experiments on each other and study our subjective reports.
>>
>>     Another approach is to perform experiments on your own brain and
>>     to write first person reports about your experience.
>>
>>     These three approaches each have tradeoffs, and each provide
>>     unique information. The first approach, in particular, might
>>     ultimately allow us to draw some of the strongest possible
>>     conclusions. For example, it allows for the scientific study of
>>     the extent to which quantum effects may or may not be relevant.
>>
>>     I'm very interested in hearing any counterarguments as to why
>>     this general approach won't work. If it /can't/ work, then I
>>     would argue that perhaps we should not create full models of
>>     ourselves, but should instead focus on upgrading ourselves. From
>>     that perspective, getting this to work is extremely important,
>>     despite however futuristic it may seem.
>>
>>     > So let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).
>>
>>     Not gonna' happen. :)
>>
>>     Brian Mingus
>>     http://grey.colorado.edu
>>
>>     On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 7:32 AM, Richard Loosemore
>>     <rloosemore at susaro.com <mailto:rloosemore at susaro.com>> wrote:
>>
>>         On 1/27/14, 11:30 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
>>
>>             Consciousness is also such a bag of worms that we can't
>>             rule out that qualia owes its totally non-obvious and a
>>             priori unpredicted existence to concepts derived from
>>             quantum mechanics, such as nested observers, or entanglement.
>>
>>             As far as I know, my litmus test for a model is the only
>>             way to tell whether low-level quantum effects are
>>             required: if the model, which has not been exposed to a
>>             corpus containing consciousness philosophy, then goes on
>>             to independently recreate consciousness philosophy,
>>             despite the fact that it is composed of (for example)
>>             point neurons, then we can be sure that low-level quantum
>>             mechanical details are not important.
>>
>>             Note, however, that such a model might still rely on
>>             nested observers or entanglement. I'll let a quantum
>>             physicist chime in on that - although I will note that
>>             according to news articles I've read that we keep
>>             managing to entangle larger and larger objects - up to
>>             the size of molecules at this time, IIRC.
>>
>>
>>             Brian Mingus
>>             http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus
>>
>>         Speaking as someone is both a physicist and a cognitive
>>         scientist, AND someone who has written papers resolving that
>>         whole C-word issue, I can tell you that the quantum story
>>         isn't nearly enough clear in the minds of physicists, yet, so
>>         how it can be applied to the C question is beyond me.
>>          Frankly, it does NOT apply:  saying anything about observers
>>         and entanglement does not at any point touch the kind of
>>         statements that involve talk about qualia etc.   So let's let
>>         that sleeping dog lie.... (?).
>>
>>         As for using the methods/standards of physics over here in
>>         cog sci ..... I think it best to listen to George Bernard
>>         Shaw on this one:  "Never do unto others as you would they do
>>         unto you:  their tastes may not be the same."
>>
>>         Our tastes (requirements/constraints/issues) are quite
>>         different, so what happens elsewhere cannot be directly,
>>         slavishly imported.
>>
>>
>>         Richard Loosemore
>>
>>         Wells College
>>         Aurora NY
>>         USA
>>
>>
>
>

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mailman.srv.cs.cmu.edu/pipermail/connectionists/attachments/20140128/789033fd/attachment.html>