[Intelligence Seminar] March 15, 3:30pm: Presentation by Itai Ashlagi - REMINDER

Dana Houston dhouston at cs.cmu.edu
Mon Mar 14 10:55:53 EDT 2011

> MARCH 15 AT 3:30PM, IN GHC 4303
> SPEAKER: ITAI ASHLAGI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
> Host: Tuomas Sandholm
> For meetings, contact Charlotte Yano (yano at cs.cmu.edu)
> As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set
> of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals.
> Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match
> patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges
> internally. This behavior has already started to be observed. We show
> that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to
> participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although
> the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to
> guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms
> of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive-compatible mechanism.
> Itai Ashlagi is an Assistant Professor at the Sloan School of Management.
> He is interested in mechanism design, market design, and game theory. In
> particular, he is interested in both developing and applying economic and
> optimization/CS tools for designing better marketplaces. Ashlagi is the
> recipient of the outstanding paper award at the ACM Conference on
> Electronic Commerce 2009. Before coming to MIT, he spent two years as a
> postdoctoral researcher at Harvard Business School. He was also a
> consultant researcher in 2010 for Microsoft Research in New England. He
> graduated from Technion-Israel Institute of Technology in 2008.

Dana M. Houston
Language Technologies Institute
School of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
5407 Gates Hillman Complex
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

T:  (412)268-6591
F:  (412)268-6298

More information about the intelligence-seminar-announce mailing list