[Intelligence Seminar] March 15, 3:30pm: Presentation by Itai Ashlagi

[Dana Houston]

INTELLIGENCE SEMINAR
MARCH 15 AT 3:30PM, IN GHC 4303

SPEAKER: ITAI ASHLAGI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Host: Tuomas Sandholm
For meetings, contact Charlotte Yano (yano at cs.cmu.edu)

INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY AND PARTICIPATION IN LARGE SCALE,
MULTI-HOSPITAL KIDNEY EXCHANGE

As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set
of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals.
Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match
patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges
internally. This behavior has already started to be observed. We show
that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to
participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although
the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to
guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms
of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive-compatible mechanism.

BIO

Itai Ashlagi is an Assistant Professor at the Sloan School of Management.
He is interested in mechanism design, market design, and game theory. In
particular, he is interested in both developing and applying economic and
optimization/CS tools for designing better marketplaces. Ashlagi is the
recipient of the outstanding paper award at the ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce 2009. Before coming to MIT, he spent two years as a
postdoctoral researcher at Harvard Business School. He was also a
consultant researcher in 2010 for Microsoft Research in New England. He
graduated from Technion-Israel Institute of Technology in 2008.



-- 
Dana M. Houston
Language Technologies Institute
School of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
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