[Intelligence Seminar] CANCELED - March 15, 3:30pm: Presentation by Itai Ashlagi - CANCELED

Dana Houston dhouston at cs.cmu.edu
Tue Mar 15 08:49:00 EDT 2011



The Intelligence Seminar for tomorrow has been canceled.



On 3/14/2011 10:55 AM, Dana Houston wrote:
>
> INTELLIGENCE SEMINAR
>> MARCH 15 AT 3:30PM, IN GHC 4303
>>
>> SPEAKER: ITAI ASHLAGI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
>> Host: Tuomas Sandholm
>> For meetings, contact Charlotte Yano (yano at cs.cmu.edu)
>>
>> INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY AND PARTICIPATION IN LARGE SCALE,
>> MULTI-HOSPITAL KIDNEY EXCHANGE
>>
>> As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set
>> of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals.
>> Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match
>> patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges
>> internally. This behavior has already started to be observed. We show
>> that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to
>> participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although
>> the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to
>> guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms
>> of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive-compatible mechanism.
>>
>> BIO
>>
>> Itai Ashlagi is an Assistant Professor at the Sloan School of 
>> Management.
>> He is interested in mechanism design, market design, and game theory. In
>> particular, he is interested in both developing and applying economic 
>> and
>> optimization/CS tools for designing better marketplaces. Ashlagi is the
>> recipient of the outstanding paper award at the ACM Conference on
>> Electronic Commerce 2009. Before coming to MIT, he spent two years as a
>> postdoctoral researcher at Harvard Business School. He was also a
>> consultant researcher in 2010 for Microsoft Research in New England. He
>> graduated from Technion-Israel Institute of Technology in 2008.
>>
>>
>>
>

-- 
Dana M. Houston
Language Technologies Institute
School of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
5407 Gates Hillman Complex
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

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