Connectionists: Weird beliefs about consciousness

Fri Feb 18 00:49:22 EST 2022

Dear Asim:
This is how I see it – without warranties…
Consciousness at a low level is necessary for a distributed system with computational delays and learned predictive capabilities. It can arise as a consequence of having synchronous internal predictive and generative representations and external observations about the actions of the self. All components of this loop; (a) observation of the actions, (b) representation of the actions, (c) actions should be synchronous. That has consequences on free will in the 200 ms domain. Since model-based prediction can achieve synchronicity, the same system can be developed further for more extended time scales.
Then -- in agreement with Hava Siegelmann's proposal -- the problem disappears. The curse of dimensionality remains, and, from the point of view of intelligence, there is a need for algorithms that can overcome the curse and find the relevant (and few) components for problem-solving.
One such component is the self, its own features, including its own capabilities and desires. Self-consciousness emerges if the self is separated from the rest of the world (being a more challenging task and developing slowly for many autistic people, for example). Constraints of the self can be established, and free will can play a role within these constraints. It is very different from low-level consciousness.
Best,
András

------------------------------------

Andras Lorincz
http://nipg.inf.elte.hu/
Fellow of the European Association for Artificial Intelligence
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EjETXQkAAAAJ&hl=en
Department of Artificial Intelligence
Faculty of Informatics
Eotvos Lorand University
Budapest, Hungary

________________________________
From: Asim Roy <ASIM.ROY at asu.edu>
Sent: Friday, February 18, 2022 5:22 AM
To: Andras Lorincz <lorincz at inf.elte.hu>; Stephen José Hanson <jose at rubic.rutgers.edu>; Gary Marcus <gary.marcus at nyu.edu>
Cc: Connectionists <Connectionists at cs.cmu.edu>
Subject: RE: Connectionists: Weird beliefs about consciousness

In 1998, after our debate about the brain at the WCCI in Anchorage, Alaska, I asked Walter Freeman if he thought the brain controls the body. His answer was, you can also say that the body controls the brain. I then asked him if the driver controls a car, or the pilot controls an airplane. His answer was the same, that you can also say that the car controls the driver, or the plane controls the pilot. I then realized that Walter was also a philosopher and believed in the No-free Will theory and what he was arguing for is that the world is simply made of interacting systems. However, both Walter, and his close friend John Taylor, were into consciousness.

I have argued with Walter on many different topics over nearly two decades and have utmost respect for him as a scholar, but this first argument I will always remember.

Obviously, there’s a conflict between consciousness and the No-free Will theory. Wonder where we stand with regard to this conflict.

Asim Roy

Professor, Information Systems

Arizona State University

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From: Connectionists <connectionists-bounces at mailman.srv.cs.cmu.edu> On Behalf Of Andras Lorincz
Sent: Tuesday, February 15, 2022 6:50 AM
To: Stephen José Hanson <jose at rubic.rutgers.edu>; Gary Marcus <gary.marcus at nyu.edu>
Cc: Connectionists <Connectionists at cs.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Connectionists: Weird beliefs about consciousness

Dear Steve and Gary:

This is how I see (try to understand) consciousness and the related terms:

(Our) consciousness seems to be related to the close-to-deterministic nature of the episodes on from few hundred millisecond to a few second domain. Control instructions may leave our brain 200 ms earlier than the action starts and they become conscious only by that time. In addition, observations of those may also be delayed by a similar amount. (It then follows that the launching of the control actions is not conscious and -- therefore -- free will can be debated in this very limited context.) On the other hand, model-based synchronization is necessary for timely observation, planning, decision making, and execution in a distributed and slow computational system. If this model-based synchronization is not working properly, then the observation of the world breaks and schizophrenic symptoms appear. As an example, individuals with pronounced schizotypal traits are particularly successful in self-tickling (source: https://philpapers.org/rec/LEMIWP<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/philpapers.org/rec/LEMIWP__;!!IKRxdwAv5BmarQ!P1ufmU5XnzpvjxtS2M0AnytlX24RNsoDeNPfsqUNWbF6OU5p9xMqtMj9S3Pn3cY$>, and a discussion on Asperger and schizophrenia: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyt.2020.503462/full<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyt.2020.503462/full__;!!IKRxdwAv5BmarQ!P1ufmU5XnzpvjxtS2M0AnytlX24RNsoDeNPfsqUNWbF6OU5p9xMqtMj9l5NkQt4$>) a manifestation of improper binding. The internal model enables and the synchronization requires the internal model and thus a certain level of consciousness can appear in a time interval around the actual time instant and its length depends on the short-term memory.

Other issues, like separating the self from the rest of the world are more closely related to the soft/hard style interventions (as called in the recent deep learning literature), i.e., those components (features) that can be modified/controlled, e.g., color and speed, and the ones that are Lego-like and can be separated/amputed/occluded/added.

Best,

Andras

------------------------------------

Andras Lorincz

http://nipg.inf.elte.hu/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/nipg.inf.elte.hu/__;!!IKRxdwAv5BmarQ!P1ufmU5XnzpvjxtS2M0AnytlX24RNsoDeNPfsqUNWbF6OU5p9xMqtMj9j2LbdH0$>

Fellow of the European Association for Artificial Intelligence

https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EjETXQkAAAAJ&hl=en<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/scholar.google.com/citations?user=EjETXQkAAAAJ&hl=en__;!!IKRxdwAv5BmarQ!P1ufmU5XnzpvjxtS2M0AnytlX24RNsoDeNPfsqUNWbF6OU5p9xMqtMj99i1VRm0$>

Department of Artificial Intelligence

Faculty of Informatics

Eotvos Lorand University

Budapest, Hungary

________________________________

From: Connectionists <connectionists-bounces at mailman.srv.cs.cmu.edu<mailto:connectionists-bounces at mailman.srv.cs.cmu.edu>> on behalf of Stephen José Hanson <jose at rubic.rutgers.edu<mailto:jose at rubic.rutgers.edu>>
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2022 8:30 PM
To: Gary Marcus <gary.marcus at nyu.edu<mailto:gary.marcus at nyu.edu>>
Cc: Connectionists <connectionists at cs.cmu.edu<mailto:connectionists at cs.cmu.edu>>
Subject: Re: Connectionists: Weird beliefs about consciousness

Gary,  these weren't criterion.     Let me try again.

I wasn't talking about wake-sleep cycles... I was talking about being awake or asleep and the transition that ensues..

Rooba's don't sleep.. they turn off, I have two of them.  They turn on once (1) their batteries are recharged (2) a timer has been set for being turned on.

GPT3 is essentially a CYC that actually works.. by reading Wikipedia (which of course is a terribly biased sample).

I was indicating the difference between implicit and explicit learning/problem solving.    Implicit learning/memory is unconscious and similar to a habit.. (good or bad).

I believe that when someone says "is gpt3 conscious?"  they are asking: is gpt3 self-aware?      Roombas know about vacuuming and they are unconscious.

S

On 2/14/22 12:45 PM, Gary Marcus wrote:

Stephen,

On criteria (1)-(3), a high-end, mapping-equippped Roomba is far more plausible as a consciousness than GPT-3.

1. The Roomba has a clearly defined wake-sleep cycle; GPT does not.

2. Roomba makes choices based on an explicit representation of its location relative to a mapped space. GPT lacks any consistent reflection of self; eg if you ask it, as I have, if you are you person, and then ask if it is a computer, it’s liable to say yes to both, showing no stable knowledge of self.

3. Roomba has explicit, declarative knowledge eg of walls and other boundaries, as well its own location. GPT has no systematically interrogable explicit representations.

All this is said with tongue lodged partway in cheek, but I honestly don’t see what criterion would lead anyone to believe that GPT is a more plausible candidate for consciousness than any other AI program out there.

ELIZA long ago showed that you could produce fluent speech that was mildly contextually relevant, and even convincing to the untutored; just because GPT is a better version of that trick doesn’t mean it’s any more conscious.

Gary

On Feb 14, 2022, at 08:56, Stephen José Hanson <jose at rubic.rutgers.edu><mailto:jose at rubic.rutgers.edu> wrote:

this is a great list of behavior..

Some biologically might be termed reflexive, taxes, classically conditioned, implicit (memory/learning)... all however would not be
conscious in the several senses:  (1)  wakefulness-- sleep  (2) self aware (3) explicit/declarative.

I think the term is used very loosely, and I believe what GPT3 and other AI are hoping to show signs of is "self-awareness"..

In response to :  "why are you doing that?",  "What are you doing now", "what will you be doing in 2030?"

Steve

On 2/14/22 10:46 AM, Iam Palatnik wrote:

A somewhat related question, just out of curiosity.

Imagine the following:

- An automatic solar panel that tracks the position of the sun.

- A group of single celled microbes with phototaxis that follow the sunlight.

- A jellyfish (animal without a brain) that follows/avoids the sunlight.

- A cockroach (animal with a brain) that avoids the sunlight.

- A drone with onboard AI that flies to regions of more intense sunlight to recharge its batteries.

- A human that dislikes sunlight and actively avoids it.

Can any of these, beside the human, be said to be aware or conscious of the sunlight, and why?

What is most relevant? Being a biological life form, having a brain, being able to make decisions based on the environment? Being taxonomically close to humans?

On Mon, Feb 14, 2022 at 12:06 PM Gary Marcus <gary.marcus at nyu.edu<mailto:gary.marcus at nyu.edu>> wrote:

Also true: Many AI researchers are very unclear about what consciousness is and also very sure that ELIZA doesn’t have it.

Neither ELIZA nor GPT-3 have
- anything remotely related to embodiment
- any capacity to reflect upon themselves

Hypothesis: neither keyword matching nor tensor manipulation, even at scale, suffice in themselves to qualify for consciousness.

- Gary

> On Feb 14, 2022, at 00:24, Geoffrey Hinton <geoffrey.hinton at gmail.com<mailto:geoffrey.hinton at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Many AI researchers are very unclear about what consciousness is and also very sure that GPT-3 doesn’t have it. It’s a strange combination.
>
>

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