Connectionists: Best practices in model publication

Christos Dimitrakakis christos.dimitrakakis at gmail.com
Thu Jan 30 01:31:49 EST 2014


I wouldn't complain too much about people ignoring your article, Richard 
  - god knows I have a few about which I can say the same :)

Anyway, the relationships between global and local mechanisms are 
studied both formally and informally - most notably in economics and 
decision theory, which are of course closely linked both to psychology 
and artificial intelligence. The models that are studied are sometimes 
amenable to theoretical analysis, but more and more frequently 
simulations are used. I really do not see the empirical disconnect that 
you claim, though of course most people are happier either tinkering or 
doing theoretical analysis.



On 30/01/14 02:38, Richard Loosemore wrote:
> On 1/29/14, 6:52 PM, james bower wrote:
>> Interesting
>>
>> With respect to the cortical column discussion we didn’t yet have
>> (whether they exist or not), there were actually two papers published
>> by Vernon Mountcastle in the late 1950s in which the cortical column
>> idea was introduced.
>>
>> The first included mostly the data, the second mostly the idea.
>>
>> I once plotted literature citations for the two papers.  For the first
>> 10 years, the data paper was cited much more than the theory paper.
>>  However, 15 year out they crossed and now the data paper is almost
>> never sited.
>>
>> So, as mentioned earlier with Marr and Albus, perhaps it is a kind of
>> theory envy in neuroscience, but it is not at all unusual in
>> neuroscience  to have exactly the opposite be the case, that the data
>> is forgotten and the theory persist.
>>
>> Perhaps all this is leading to an interesting article (or perhaps book
>> with a series of essays) on how physics and biology are similar and
>> different.  Anyone interested?
>>
> I mentioned earlier in the discussion that I myself *have* explicitly
> considered this issue:  trying to understand what it is about cognitive
> systems that could make them not directable amenable to the methods of
> physics.  I published a paper about it in 2007 and then a chapter
> expanding the same idea in 2012 (refs below).
>
> The conclusions I came to have been (and I am sure will continue to be)
> completely ignored.
>
> Nobody wants to hear that this or that methodology is what they *should*
> be adopting.  Nobody will never give a hoot about such a message.  It is
> considered, in the psychological/cognitive sciences to be almost rude
> (not to say gauche) to tell other people how they should be doing science.
>
> So compile a book about the book about "physics and biology are similar
> and different" if you feel inclined, but all it will do is act as a
> bookcase-weight.
>
> Richard Loosemore
>
>
>
>
>
> Refs:
>
> Loosemore, R.P.W. (2007).  Complex Systems, Artificial Intelligence and
> Theoretical Psychology.  In B. Goertzel & P. Wang (Eds.), Proceedings of
> the 2006 AGI Workshop.  IOS Press, Amsterdam.
>
> Loosemore, R.P.W. (2012b).  The Complex Cognitive Systems Manifesto.
> In:  The Yearbook of Nanotechnology, Volume III: Nanotechnology, the
> Brain, and the Future, S. Hays, J. S. Robert, C. A. Miller, and I.
> Bennett (Eds). New York, NY: Springer, (2012)


-- 
Christos Dimitrakakis
http://www.cse.chalmers.se/~chrdimi/


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