Connectionists: Physics and Psychology (and the C-word)

[Brian J Mingus]

Hi Richard, thanks for the feedback.

> Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates with C ...
that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous meaning for C itself
(which I don't think anyone has, so therefore it is, after all, of no value
to look for outcome measures that correlate)

Actually, the outcome measure I described is independent of a clear and
unambiguous meaning for C itself, and in an interesting way: the models,
like us, essentially reinvent the entire literature, and have a
conversation as we do, inventing almost all the same positions that we've
invented (including the one in your paper).

I will read your paper and see if it changes my position. At the present
time, however, I can't imagine any information that would solve the
so-called zombie problem. I'm not a big fan of integrative information
theory - I don't think hydrogen atoms are conscious, and I don't think
naive bayes trained on a large corpus and run in generative mode is
conscious. Thus, if the model doesn't go through the same philosophical
reasoning that we've collectively gone through with regards to subjective
experience, then I'm going to wonder if its experience is anything like
mine at all.

Touching back on QM, if we create a point neuron-based model that doesn't
wax philosophical on consciousness, I'm going to wonder if we should add
lower levels of analysis.

I will take a look at your paper, and see if it changes my view on this at
all.

Cheers,

Brian Mingus

http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus



On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 12:05 PM, Richard Loosemore
<rloosemore at susaro.com>wrote:

>
>
> Brian,
>
> Everything hinges on the definition of the concept ("consciousness") under
> consideration.
>
> In the chapter I wrote in Wang & Goertzel's "Theoretical Foundations of
> Artificial General Intelligence" I pointed out (echoing Chalmers) that too
> much is said about C without a clear enough understanding of what is meant
> by it .... and then I went on to clarify what exactly could be meant by it,
> and thereby came to a resolution of the problem (with testable
> predictions).   So I think the answer to the question you pose below is
> that:
>
> (a) Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates with C ...
> that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous meaning for C itself
> (which I don't think anyone has, so therefore it is, after all, of no value
> to look for outcome measures that correlate), and
>
> (b) All three of the approaches you mention are sidelined and finessed by
> the approach I used in the abovementioned paper, where I clarify the
> definition by clarifying first why we have so much difficulty defining it.
> In other words, there is a fourth way, and that is to explain it as ...
> well, I have to leave that dangling because there is too much subtlety to
> pack into an elevator pitch.  (The title is the best I can do:  " Human and
> Machine Consciousness as a Boundary Effect in the Concept Analysis
> Mechanism ").
>
> Certainly though, the weakness of all quantum mechanics 'answers' is that
> they are stranded on the wrong side of the explanatory gap.
>
>
> Richard Loosemore
>
>
> Reference
> Loosemore, R.P.W. (2012).  Human and Machine Consciousness as a Boundary
> Effect in the Concept Analysis Mechanism.  In: P. Wang & B. Goertzel (Eds),
> Theoretical Foundations of Artifical General Intelligence.  Atlantis Press.
> http://richardloosemore.com/docs/2012a_Consciousness_rpwl.pdf
>
>
>
> On 1/28/14, 10:34 AM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
>
>  Hi Richard,
>
>  > I can tell you that the quantum story isn't nearly enough clear in the
> minds of physicists, yet, so how it can be applied to the C question is
> beyond me.  Frankly, it does NOT apply:  saying anything about observers
> and entanglement does not at any point touch the kind of statements that
> involve talk about qualia etc.
>
>  I'm not sure I see the argument you're trying to make here. If you have
> an outcome measure that you agree correlates with consciousness, then we
> have a framework for scientifically studying it.
>
>  Here's my setup: If you create a society of models and do not expose
> them to a corpus containing consciousness philosophy and they then, in a
> reasonably short amount of time, independently rewrite it, they are almost
> certainly conscious. This design explicitly rules out a generative model
> that accidentally spits out consciousness philosophy.
>
>  Another approach is to accept that our brains are so similar that you
> and I are almost certainly both conscious, and to then perform experiments
> on each other and study our subjective reports.
>
>  Another approach is to perform experiments on your own brain and to
> write first person reports about your experience.
>
>  These three approaches each have tradeoffs, and each provide unique
> information. The first approach, in particular, might ultimately allow us
> to draw some of the strongest possible conclusions. For example, it allows
> for the scientific study of the extent to which quantum effects may or may
> not be relevant.
>
>  I'm very interested in hearing any counterarguments as to why this
> general approach won't work. If it *can't* work, then I would argue that
> perhaps we should not create full models of ourselves, but should instead
> focus on upgrading ourselves. From that perspective, getting this to work
> is extremely important, despite however futuristic it may seem.
>
>  > So let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).
>
>  Not gonna' happen. :)
>
>  Brian Mingus
> http://grey.colorado.edu
>
>  On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 7:32 AM, Richard Loosemore <rloosemore at susaro.com
> > wrote:
>
>> On 1/27/14, 11:30 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
>>
>>> Consciousness is also such a bag of worms that we can't rule out that
>>> qualia owes its totally non-obvious and a priori unpredicted existence to
>>> concepts derived from quantum mechanics, such as nested observers, or
>>> entanglement.
>>>
>>> As far as I know, my litmus test for a model is the only way to tell
>>> whether low-level quantum effects are required: if the model, which has not
>>> been exposed to a corpus containing consciousness philosophy, then goes on
>>> to independently recreate consciousness philosophy, despite the fact that
>>> it is composed of (for example) point neurons, then we can be sure that
>>> low-level quantum mechanical details are not important.
>>>
>>> Note, however, that such a model might still rely on nested observers or
>>> entanglement. I'll let a quantum physicist chime in on that - although I
>>> will note that according to news articles I've read that we keep managing
>>> to entangle larger and larger objects - up to the size of molecules at this
>>> time, IIRC.
>>>
>>>
>>> Brian Mingus
>>> http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus
>>>
>>>  Speaking as someone is both a physicist and a cognitive scientist, AND
>> someone who has written papers resolving that whole C-word issue, I can
>> tell you that the quantum story isn't nearly enough clear in the minds of
>> physicists, yet, so how it can be applied to the C question is beyond me.
>>  Frankly, it does NOT apply:  saying anything about observers and
>> entanglement does not at any point touch the kind of statements that
>> involve talk about qualia etc.   So let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).
>>
>> As for using the methods/standards of physics over here in cog sci .....
>> I think it best to listen to George Bernard Shaw on this one:  "Never do
>> unto others as you would they do unto you:  their tastes may not be the
>> same."
>>
>> Our tastes (requirements/constraints/issues) are quite different, so what
>> happens elsewhere cannot be directly, slavishly imported.
>>
>>
>> Richard Loosemore
>>
>> Wells College
>> Aurora NY
>> USA
>>
>>
>
>
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