<div dir="ltr">Hi Richard, thanks for the feedback. <div><br></div><div><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px">> Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates with C ... that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous meaning for C itself (which I don't think anyone has, so therefore it is, after all, of no value to look for outcome measures that correlate)</span><br>
</div><div><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px"><br></span></div><div><font face="arial, sans-serif">Actually, the outcome measure I described is independent of a clear and unambiguous meaning for C itself, and in an interesting way: the models, like us, essentially reinvent the entire literature, and have a conversation as we do, inventing almost all the same positions that we've invented (including the one in your paper). </font></div>
<div><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br></font></div><div>I will read your paper and see if it changes my position. At the present time, however, I can't imagine any information that would solve the so-called zombie problem. I'm not a big fan of integrative information theory - I don't think hydrogen atoms are conscious, and I don't think naive bayes trained on a large corpus and run in generative mode is conscious. Thus, if the model doesn't go through the same philosophical reasoning that we've collectively gone through with regards to subjective experience, then I'm going to wonder if its experience is anything like mine at all.<br>
</div><div><br></div><div>Touching back on QM, if we create a point neuron-based model that doesn't wax philosophical on consciousness, I'm going to wonder if we should add lower levels of analysis.</div><div><br>
</div><div>I will take a look at your paper, and see if it changes my view on this at all.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div>
<div><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br></font></div><div><font face="arial, sans-serif">Brian Mingus</font></div><div><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br></font></div><div><font face="arial, sans-serif"><a href="http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus" target="_blank">http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus</a></font></div>
<div><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px"><br></span></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 12:05 PM, Richard Loosemore <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:rloosemore@susaro.com" target="_blank">rloosemore@susaro.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<br>
<br>
Brian,<br>
<br>
Everything hinges on the definition of the concept ("consciousness")
under consideration.<br>
<br>
In the chapter I wrote in
Wang & Goertzel's "Theoretical Foundations of Artificial General
Intelligence" I pointed out (echoing Chalmers) that too much is said
about C without a clear enough understanding of what is meant by it
.... and then I went on to clarify what exactly could be meant by
it, and thereby came to a resolution of the problem (with testable
predictions). So I think the answer to the question you pose below
is that:<br>
<br>
(a) Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates with
C ... that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous meaning for
C itself (which I don't think anyone has, so therefore it is, after
all, of no value to look for outcome measures that correlate), and <br>
<br>
(b) All three of the approaches you mention are sidelined and
finessed by the approach I used in the abovementioned paper, where I
clarify the definition by clarifying first why we have so much
difficulty defining it. In other words, there is a fourth way, and
that is to explain it as ... well, I have to leave that dangling
because there is too much subtlety to pack into an elevator pitch.
(The title is the best I can do: "
Human and Machine Consciousness as a Boundary Effect in the Concept
Analysis Mechanism
").<br>
<br>
Certainly though, the weakness of all quantum mechanics 'answers' is
that they are stranded on the wrong side of the explanatory gap.<br>
<br>
<br>
Richard Loosemore<br>
<br>
<br>
Reference<br>
Loosemore, R.P.W. (2012). Human and Machine Consciousness as a
Boundary Effect in the Concept Analysis Mechanism. In: P. Wang
& B. Goertzel (Eds), Theoretical Foundations of Artifical
General Intelligence. Atlantis Press.<br>
<a href="http://richardloosemore.com/docs/2012a_Consciousness_rpwl.pdf" target="_blank">http://richardloosemore.com/docs/2012a_Consciousness_rpwl.pdf</a><div><div><br>
<br>
<br>
On 1/28/14, 10:34 AM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_extra">Hi Richard,</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">> I can tell you that the quantum
story isn't nearly enough clear in the minds of physicists,
yet, so how it can be applied to the C question is beyond me.
Frankly, it does NOT apply: saying anything about observers
and entanglement does not at any point touch the kind of
statements that involve talk about qualia etc.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">I'm not sure I see the argument you're
trying to make here. If you have an outcome measure that you
agree correlates with consciousness, then we have a framework
for scientifically studying it. </div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">Here's my setup: If you create a
society of models and do not expose them to a corpus
containing consciousness philosophy and they then, in a
reasonably short amount of time, independently rewrite it,
they are almost certainly conscious. This design explicitly
rules out a generative model that accidentally spits out
consciousness philosophy.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">Another approach is to accept that our
brains are so similar that you and I are almost certainly both
conscious, and to then perform experiments on each other and
study our subjective reports.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">Another approach is to perform
experiments on your own brain and to write first person
reports about your experience.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">
These three approaches each have tradeoffs, and each provide
unique information. The first approach, in particular, might
ultimately allow us to draw some of the strongest possible
conclusions. For example, it allows for the scientific study
of the extent to which quantum effects may or may not be
relevant.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">I'm very interested in hearing any
counterarguments as to why this general approach won't work.
If it <i>can't</i> work, then I would argue that perhaps we
should not create full models of ourselves, but should instead
focus on upgrading ourselves. From that perspective, getting
this to work is extremely important, despite however
futuristic it may seem.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">> <span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px">So
let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).</span></div>
<div class="gmail_extra">
<span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px"><br>
</span></div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px">Not
gonna' happen. :)</span></div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">Brian Mingus</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><a href="http://grey.colorado.edu" target="_blank">http://grey.colorado.edu</a></div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 7:32 AM, Richard Loosemore <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:rloosemore@susaro.com" target="_blank">rloosemore@susaro.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">On
1/27/14, 11:30 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
Consciousness is also such a bag of worms that we can't
rule out that qualia owes its totally non-obvious and a
priori unpredicted existence to concepts derived from
quantum mechanics, such as nested observers, or
entanglement.<br>
<br>
As far as I know, my litmus test for a model is the only
way to tell whether low-level quantum effects are
required: if the model, which has not been exposed to a
corpus containing consciousness philosophy, then goes on
to independently recreate consciousness philosophy,
despite the fact that it is composed of (for example)
point neurons, then we can be sure that low-level
quantum mechanical details are not important.<br>
<br>
Note, however, that such a model might still rely on
nested observers or entanglement. I'll let a quantum
physicist chime in on that - although I will note that
according to news articles I've read that we keep
managing to entangle larger and larger objects - up to
the size of molecules at this time, IIRC.<br>
<br>
<br>
Brian Mingus<br>
<a href="http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus" target="_blank">http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
Speaking as someone is both a physicist and a cognitive
scientist, AND someone who has written papers resolving
that whole C-word issue, I can tell you that the quantum
story isn't nearly enough clear in the minds of
physicists, yet, so how it can be applied to the C
question is beyond me. Frankly, it does NOT apply:
saying anything about observers and entanglement does not
at any point touch the kind of statements that involve
talk about qualia etc. So let's let that sleeping dog
lie.... (?).<br>
<br>
As for using the methods/standards of physics over here in
cog sci ..... I think it best to listen to George Bernard
Shaw on this one: "Never do unto others as you would they
do unto you: their tastes may not be the same."<br>
<br>
Our tastes (requirements/constraints/issues) are quite
different, so what happens elsewhere cannot be directly,
slavishly imported.<br>
<br>
<br>
Richard Loosemore<br>
<br>
Wells College<br>
Aurora NY<br>
USA<br>
<br>
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</div>
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