Modularity vs. Wholistic Connectivity

[Bob Hadley]

  A pdf file for the following New Paper is now available at:

	   www.cs.sfu.ca/~hadley/modular.pdf

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


		  A DEFENSE OF FUNCTIONAL MODULARITY
				   
				  by

			   Robert F. Hadley
 

		     School of Computing Science
				 and
		      Cognitive Science Program

		       Simon Fraser University

				   
			       Abstract

 Although belief in the existence of mental modules  of some
form is widespread among cognitive researchers, neurally
sophisticated researchers commonly resist the view that cognitive
processing involves modules which are  functionally
independent of one another.   Moreover, within the past few
years, at least three noted researchers (Fodor, Kosslyn, and
Uttal)  have called into serious question the existence of
distinct modules in  broad areas of human cognition.   

The present paper offers a defense of the existence of 
functionally independent modules, which, though spatially
distributed, communicate via traditionally conceived input/output
channels.  This defense proceeds (i)  by showing that the
anti-modularity arguments of Fodor, Kosslyn, and Uttal are not
compelling; (ii) by presenting theoretically-grounded reasons why
any connectionist is committed, via the most basic tenets of
connectionism, to accepting the existence of functionally
independent modules; (iii)  by presenting wholistically inclined
connectionists with a novel challenge, namely, to demonstrate
that a single, wholistic network could display strong levels of
generalization as a  side-effect of multiple, previously
acquired skills.   In the course of these arguments,  I examine a
recent  generalization challenge posed by Phillips (2000) to
eliminative connectionists. 


    32 pages, with 1.2 spacing