[Intelligence Seminar] November 6, 12:00 noon: , Presentation by Milind Tambe

Dana Houston dhouston at cs.cmu.edu
Thu Nov 1 11:12:49 EDT 2012


This talk is a joint presentation for Intelligence Seminar
and Algorithmic Economics Seminar.

SPEAKER: MILIND TAMBE (University of Southern California)
Host: Ariel Procaccia
For meetings, contact Pat Loring (sawako at cs.cmu.edu 
<mailto:sawako at cs.cmu.edu>)


Security is a critical concern around the world, whether it is the
challenge of protecting ports, airports, and other critical national
infrastructure, or protecting wildlife and forests, or suppressing crime
in urban areas. In many of these cases, limited security resources prevent
full security coverage at all times. Instead, these limited resources must
be scheduled, avoiding schedule predictability, while simultaneously
taking into account different target priorities, the responses of the
adversaries to the security posture, and potential uncertainty over
adversary types.

Computational game theory can help design such unpredictable security
schedules. Indeed, casting the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game, we
have developed new algorithms that are now deployed over multiple years in
multiple applications for security scheduling: for the US coast guard in
Boston and New York (and potentially other ports), for the Federal Air
Marshals, for the Los Angeles Airport Police, with the Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department for patrolling metro trains, with further
applications under evaluation for the TSA and other agencies. These
applications are leading to real-world use-inspired research in the
emerging research area of security games. Specifically, the research
challenges posed by these applications include scaling up security games
to large-scale problems, handling significant adversarial uncertainty,
dealing with bounded rationality of human adversaries, and other
interdisciplinary challenges. This lecture will provide an overview of my
research group's work in this area, outlining key algorithmic principles
and research results, as well as a discussion of our deployed systems and
lessons learned.


Milind Tambe is Helen N. and Emmett H. Jones Professor in Engineering, and
Professor of Computer Science and Industrial and Systems Engineering at
the University of Southern California (USC). He leads the Teamcore
Research Group at USC, with research focused on agent-based and
multi-agent systems. He is a fellow of AAAI, recipient of the ACM
Autonomous Agents Research Award, as well as recipient of the Christopher
Columbus Fellowship Foundation Homeland Security Award. In addition, he is
also recipient of the "influential paper award" from the International
Foundation for Agents and Multiagent Systems, the Rist Prize of the
Military Operations Research Society, US Coast Guard First District's
Operational Excellence Award, Certificate of Appreciation from the US
Federal Air Marshals Service, special commendation given by the Los
Angeles World Airports police from the city of Los Angeles, IBM Faculty
Award, Okawa Foundation faculty research award, the RoboCup scientific
challenge award, USC Viterbi School of Engineering use-inspired research
award, USC Steven B. Sample Teaching and Mentoring award, and the ACM
recognition of service award. Prof. Tambe and his research group's papers
have been selected as best papers at a number of premier artificial
intelligence conferences and workshops; these have included best paper
awards at the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems and International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents.
Additionally, algorithms developed by his Teamcore research group have
been deployed for real-world use by several agencies including the US
Coast Guard, the US Federal Air Marshals service, LAX Police, and the LA
Sheriff's Department. He received his Ph.D. from the School of Computer
Science at Carnegie Mellon University.

Dana M. Houston
Language Technologies Institute
School of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
5405 Gates Hillman Complex
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

T:  (412)268-4717
F:  (412)268-6298

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