[Intelligence Seminar] CANCELED - March 15, 3:30pm: Presentation by Itai Ashlagi - CANCELED

Dana Houston dhouston at cs.cmu.edu
Tue Mar 15 08:52:30 EDT 2011

Correction: The seminar for TODAY has been canceled.

On 3/15/2011 8:49 AM, Dana Houston wrote:
> The Intelligence Seminar for tomorrow has been canceled.
> On 3/14/2011 10:55 AM, Dana Houston wrote:
>>> MARCH 15 AT 3:30PM, IN GHC 4303
>>> SPEAKER: ITAI ASHLAGI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
>>> Host: Tuomas Sandholm
>>> For meetings, contact Charlotte Yano (yano at cs.cmu.edu)
>>> As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set
>>> of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals.
>>> Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match
>>> patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges
>>> internally. This behavior has already started to be observed. We show
>>> that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to
>>> participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although
>>> the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to
>>> guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms
>>> of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive-compatible 
>>> mechanism.
>>> BIO
>>> Itai Ashlagi is an Assistant Professor at the Sloan School of 
>>> Management.
>>> He is interested in mechanism design, market design, and game 
>>> theory. In
>>> particular, he is interested in both developing and applying 
>>> economic and
>>> optimization/CS tools for designing better marketplaces. Ashlagi is the
>>> recipient of the outstanding paper award at the ACM Conference on
>>> Electronic Commerce 2009. Before coming to MIT, he spent two years as a
>>> postdoctoral researcher at Harvard Business School. He was also a
>>> consultant researcher in 2010 for Microsoft Research in New England. He
>>> graduated from Technion-Israel Institute of Technology in 2008.

Dana M. Houston
Language Technologies Institute
School of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
5407 Gates Hillman Complex
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

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