Connectionists: Brain-like computing fanfare and big data fanfare

[Ivan Raikov]

Well, I think it is not so clear that we will be swallowed up by
statistical methods, because exact Bayesian inference is NP-hard.
I think you will have a really hard time arguing that the brain solves
NP-hard problems.
In fact, I think a central question is how the heck does the brain *avoid*
having to solve NP-hard problems :-)
Of course, there are many kinds of inexact inference algorithms based on
random sampling, which have polynomial time complexity,
but they usually have problems with optimality. So I think statistics is
just one more tool for those cases when there  is no data.

   Ivan



On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 9:41 AM, Tsvi Achler <achler at gmail.com> wrote:

> I can't resist commenting anymore.
>
> It is interesting that the subject of quantum mechanics is being
> discussed here.  From what I understand, Einstein never liked quantum
> mechanics because it replaces mechanics that are unknown with
> statistics. Subsequently electrons and atomic particle locations are
> represented by a probabilistic density functions.  In this way, yet
> unknown mechanisms can be quantified and characterized statistically
> moving the physics forward to some degree.
>
> However neuroscience has an equivalent.  It is Bayesian networks.
> Using a statistical framework, neural connections and activations are
> modeled with statistical distributions.  Using the the conditional
> density function, priors, their distributions, and the Bayes equation
> the posterior probability (recognition) is calculated.
>
> Bayesian methods have been extremely successful in explaining
> cognitive and neural data.  However they are not true neural networks
> because the connections are statistically defined.  In some sense I
> think connectionists are being squeezed by Bayesian networks because
> they are now the go-to for cognitive modeling, not neural networks.
>
> I think the neural network community is in the unique position to
> truly explain neural function, and that's its biggest contribution.
> Here are my 2 cents: I think if we do not stay close to the biology we
> will be swallowed up by statistical methods.
>
> I would like to hear what others think.
>
> Sincerely,
> -Tsvi
>
> On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 2:26 AM, Włodzisław Duch <wduch at is.umk.pl> wrote:
> > Dear all,
> >
> >
> >
> > QM has yet to show some advantages over strong synchronization in
> classical
> > models that unifies the activity of the whole network. There is another
> > aspect to this discussion: we need to go beyond naïve interpretation of
> > assigning functions to activity of single structures. We have to use a
> > formalism similar to the quantum mechanical representation theory in
> Hilbert
> > space, decomposing brain activations into combinations of other
> activations.
> > In wrote a bit about it in sec. 2 of “Neurolinguistic Approach to Natural
> > Language Processing”, Neural Networks 21(10), 1500-1510, 2008.
> >
> >
> >
> > QM seems to be attractive because we do not understand how to make a
> > transition between brain activations and subjective experience,
> described in
> > some psychological spaces, outside and inside (3rd and 1st person)
> points of
> > view. I have tried to explain it in a paper for APA,  Mind-Brain
> Relations,
> > Geometric Perspective and Neurophenomenology, American Philosophical
> > Association Newsletter 12(1), 1-7, 2012
> >
> > QM formalism of representation theory may be useful also for classical
> > distributed computing systems.
> >
> >
> >
> > Best regards, Włodek Duch
> >
> > ____________________
> >
> > Google W. Duch
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > From: Connectionists [mailto:
> connectionists-bounces at mailman.srv.cs.cmu.edu]
> > On Behalf Of Carson Chow
> > Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2014 10:01 PM
> > To: connectionists at mailman.srv.cs.cmu.edu
> > Subject: Re: Connectionists: Physics and Psychology (and the C-word)
> >
> >
> >
> > Brian,
> >
> > Quantum mechanics can be completely simulated on a classical computer so
> if
> > quantum mechanics do matter for C then it must be a matter of
> computational
> > efficiency and nothing more.  We also know that BQP (i.e. set of problems
> > solved efficiently on a quantum computer) is bigger than BPP (set of
> > problems solved effficiently on a classical computer) but not by much.
>  I'm
> > not fully up to date on this but I think factoring and boson sampling or
> > about the only two examples that are in BQP and not in BPP.  We also know
> > that BPP is much smaller than NP, so if C does require QM then for some
> > reason it sits in a small sliver of complexity space.
> >
> > best,
> > Carson
> >
> > PS I do like your self-consistent test for confirming consciousness. I
> once
> > proposed that we could just run Turing machines and see which ones asked
> why
> > they exist as a test of C.  Kind of similar to your idea.
> >
> > On 1/28/14 3:09 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
> >
> > Hi Richard, thanks for the feedback.
> >
> >
> >
> >> Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates with C ...
> that
> >> is good, but only with a clear and unambigous meaning for C itself
> (which I
> >> don't think anyone has, so therefore it is, after all, of no value to
> look
> >> for outcome measures that correlate)
> >
> >
> >
> > Actually, the outcome measure I described is independent of a clear and
> > unambiguous meaning for C itself, and in an interesting way: the models,
> > like us, essentially reinvent the entire literature, and have a
> conversation
> > as we do, inventing almost all the same positions that we've invented
> > (including the one in your paper).
> >
> >
> >
> > I will read your paper and see if it changes my position. At the present
> > time, however, I can't imagine any information that would solve the
> > so-called zombie problem. I'm not a big fan of integrative information
> > theory - I don't think hydrogen atoms are conscious, and I don't think
> naive
> > bayes trained on a large corpus and run in generative mode is conscious.
> > Thus, if the model doesn't go through the same philosophical reasoning
> that
> > we've collectively gone through with regards to subjective experience,
> then
> > I'm going to wonder if its experience is anything like mine at all.
> >
> >
> >
> > Touching back on QM, if we create a point neuron-based model that doesn't
> > wax philosophical on consciousness, I'm going to wonder if we should add
> > lower levels of analysis.
> >
> >
> >
> > I will take a look at your paper, and see if it changes my view on this
> at
> > all.
> >
> >
> >
> > Cheers,
> >
> >
> >
> > Brian Mingus
> >
> >
> >
> > http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 12:05 PM, Richard Loosemore <
> rloosemore at susaro.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > Brian,
> >
> > Everything hinges on the definition of the concept ("consciousness")
> under
> > consideration.
> >
> > In the chapter I wrote in Wang & Goertzel's "Theoretical Foundations of
> > Artificial General Intelligence" I pointed out (echoing Chalmers) that
> too
> > much is said about C without a clear enough understanding of what is
> meant
> > by it .... and then I went on to clarify what exactly could be meant by
> it,
> > and thereby came to a resolution of the problem (with testable
> predictions).
> > So I think the answer to the question you pose below is that:
> >
> > (a) Yes, in general, having an outcome measure that correlates with C ...
> > that is good, but only with a clear and unambigous meaning for C itself
> > (which I don't think anyone has, so therefore it is, after all, of no
> value
> > to look for outcome measures that correlate), and
> >
> > (b) All three of the approaches you mention are sidelined and finessed by
> > the approach I used in the abovementioned paper, where I clarify the
> > definition by clarifying first why we have so much difficulty defining
> it.
> > In other words, there is a fourth way, and that is to explain it as ...
> > well, I have to leave that dangling because there is too much subtlety to
> > pack into an elevator pitch.  (The title is the best I can do:  " Human
> and
> > Machine Consciousness as a Boundary Effect in the Concept Analysis
> Mechanism
> > ").
> >
> > Certainly though, the weakness of all quantum mechanics 'answers' is that
> > they are stranded on the wrong side of the explanatory gap.
> >
> >
> > Richard Loosemore
> >
> >
> > Reference
> > Loosemore, R.P.W. (2012).  Human and Machine Consciousness as a Boundary
> > Effect in the Concept Analysis Mechanism.  In: P. Wang & B. Goertzel
> (Eds),
> > Theoretical Foundations of Artifical General Intelligence.  Atlantis
> Press.
> > http://richardloosemore.com/docs/2012a_Consciousness_rpwl.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 1/28/14, 10:34 AM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
> >
> > Hi Richard,
> >
> >
> >
> >> I can tell you that the quantum story isn't nearly enough clear in the
> >> minds of physicists, yet, so how it can be applied to the C question is
> >> beyond me.  Frankly, it does NOT apply:  saying anything about
> observers and
> >> entanglement does not at any point touch the kind of statements that
> involve
> >> talk about qualia etc.
> >
> >
> >
> > I'm not sure I see the argument you're trying to make here. If you have
> an
> > outcome measure that you agree correlates with consciousness, then we
> have a
> > framework for scientifically studying it.
> >
> >
> >
> > Here's my setup: If you create a society of models and do not expose
> them to
> > a corpus containing consciousness philosophy and they then, in a
> reasonably
> > short amount of time, independently rewrite it, they are almost certainly
> > conscious. This design explicitly rules out a generative model that
> > accidentally spits out consciousness philosophy.
> >
> >
> >
> > Another approach is to accept that our brains are so similar that you
> and I
> > are almost certainly both conscious, and to then perform experiments on
> each
> > other and study our subjective reports.
> >
> >
> >
> > Another approach is to perform experiments on your own brain and to write
> > first person reports about your experience.
> >
> >
> >
> > These three approaches each have tradeoffs, and each provide unique
> > information. The first approach, in particular, might ultimately allow
> us to
> > draw some of the strongest possible conclusions. For example, it allows
> for
> > the scientific study of the extent to which quantum effects may or may
> not
> > be relevant.
> >
> >
> >
> > I'm very interested in hearing any counterarguments as to why this
> general
> > approach won't work. If it can't work, then I would argue that perhaps we
> > should not create full models of ourselves, but should instead focus on
> > upgrading ourselves. From that perspective, getting this to work is
> > extremely important, despite however futuristic it may seem.
> >
> >
> >
> >> So let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).
> >
> >
> >
> > Not gonna' happen. :)
> >
> >
> >
> > Brian Mingus
> >
> > http://grey.colorado.edu
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 7:32 AM, Richard Loosemore <
> rloosemore at susaro.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > On 1/27/14, 11:30 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:
> >
> > Consciousness is also such a bag of worms that we can't rule out that
> qualia
> > owes its totally non-obvious and a priori unpredicted existence to
> concepts
> > derived from quantum mechanics, such as nested observers, or
> entanglement.
> >
> > As far as I know, my litmus test for a model is the only way to tell
> whether
> > low-level quantum effects are required: if the model, which has not been
> > exposed to a corpus containing consciousness philosophy, then goes on to
> > independently recreate consciousness philosophy, despite the fact that
> it is
> > composed of (for example) point neurons, then we can be sure that
> low-level
> > quantum mechanical details are not important.
> >
> > Note, however, that such a model might still rely on nested observers or
> > entanglement. I'll let a quantum physicist chime in on that - although I
> > will note that according to news articles I've read that we keep
> managing to
> > entangle larger and larger objects - up to the size of molecules at this
> > time, IIRC.
> >
> >
> > Brian Mingus
> > http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus
> >
> > Speaking as someone is both a physicist and a cognitive scientist, AND
> > someone who has written papers resolving that whole C-word issue, I can
> tell
> > you that the quantum story isn't nearly enough clear in the minds of
> > physicists, yet, so how it can be applied to the C question is beyond me.
> > Frankly, it does NOT apply:  saying anything about observers and
> > entanglement does not at any point touch the kind of statements that
> involve
> > talk about qualia etc.   So let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).
> >
> > As for using the methods/standards of physics over here in cog sci .....
> I
> > think it best to listen to George Bernard Shaw on this one:  "Never do
> unto
> > others as you would they do unto you:  their tastes may not be the same."
> >
> > Our tastes (requirements/constraints/issues) are quite different, so what
> > happens elsewhere cannot be directly, slavishly imported.
> >
> >
> > Richard Loosemore
> >
> > Wells College
> > Aurora NY
> > USA
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
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