Bibliography available

[David Chalmers]

I originally sent this notice to a philosophy list, but somebody suggested
that I send it to connectionists as a lot of the material is relevant,
including about 60 papers on the philosophy of connectionism.
--

For the last year or so, I've been working on a bibliography of recent work
in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy
of AI.  I keep intending to distribute it when it's complete, but of course
it's never complete as I'm always coming across new things.  So maybe I
should just distribute it as it is.

It consists of 861 entries, divided into 4 parts:

1. "First-person" issues (consciousness, qualia, etc)        [218 entries]
2. "Third-person" issues (content, psych explanation, etc)   [346 entries]
3. Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence                     [155 entries]
4. Miscellaneous topics                                      [142 entries]

About half of the entries are annotated with a 1-or-2-line summary, and
occasionally criticism.  The rest I either haven't read, or haven't got
around to annotating yet.  Of course none of the bibliographies are complete,
but part 4 is particularly feeble, without any attempt at thoroughly covering
the areas involved.    The vast bulk of the bibliography consists of papers
and books from the last 10-15 years, although a little earlier material is
included where it is directly relevant to current concerns.

I've enclosed a section-by-section summary below.  To get a copy, write to
me at dave at cogsci.indiana.edu.  The files take up about 120K in total.

Dave Chalmers       (dave at cogsci.indiana.edu)
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition
Indiana University.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bibliography: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Mind and Cognition
=================================================================

Compiled by David J. Chalmers, Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition,
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408.  (c) 1990 David J. Chalmers.

Summary
-------

1.   "First-person" issues (consciousness, qualia, etc) [218]

1.1  Subjectivity (Nagel) [26] 
1.2  The Knowledge Argument (Jackson) [13]  
1.3  Functionalism and Qualia (including Absent Qualia, etc) [28]
1.4  Inverted Spectrum [12]
1.5  Qualia, General [18]
1.6  Are Programs Enough? (Searle)  [32]
1.7  Machines and Conscious Mentality (other) [15]
1.8  Mind-Body Problem (Misc) [10]
1.9  Zombies and Other Minds [4]
1.10 Consciousness -- Eliminativist Perspectives [10]
1.11 Consciousness -- Functional Accounts [21]
1.12 Consciousness, General [17]
1.13 Subjective Mental Content [4]
1.14 Dualism [8]

2.   "Third-person" issues (content, psych explanation, etc) [346]

2.1  The Reality of Propositional Psychology [50]
2.1a     General [12]
2.1b     Sententialism (esp. Fodor) [16]
2.1c     Instrumentalism (Dennett) [17]
2.1d     Syntactic Functionalism (Stich) [5]
2.2  Eliminativism, Psychology & Neuroscience (esp. Churchlands) [29]
2.2a     Eliminative Materialism [16]
2.2b     Psychology & Neuroscience [13]
2.3  Narrow/Wide Content [53]
2.3a     Why Reference is not in the Head (Putnam) [9]
2.3b     Implications for Psychology (Burge, Fodor) [20]
2.3c     The Status of Narrow Content [12]
2.3d     Miscellaneous  [12]
2.4  Causal Theories of Content [37]
2.4a     Information-Theoretic Accounts (Dretske) [11]
2.4b     Causal Accounts, General [11]
2.4c     Teleological Approaches (Millikan) [8]
2.4d     Situation Semantics (Barwise/Perry) [7]
2.5  Theories of Content, Misc [13]
2.6  Representation (General) [13]
2.7  Supervenience, Reduction, Mental Causation [46]
2.7a     Supervenience (Kim, etc) [13]
2.7b     Anomalous Monism (Davidson) [14]
2.7c     Token Identity (Davidson, etc) [4]
2.7d     Mental Causation [8]
2.7e     Mental/Physical, Misc [7]
2.8  Functionalism (General) [31]
2.9  Computationalism (General) [17]
2.10 Psychological Explanation, Misc [7]
2.11 Perception/Modularity/Plasticity (Fodor, Churchland) [12]
2.12 Nativism (Chomsky, etc) [22]
2.13 Misc Phil of Mind [16]

3.   Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence [155]

3.1  Can Machines be Conscious? -- see 1.6, 1.7.
3.2  Computationalism as Psychological Explanation -- see 2.9.
3.3  The Turing Test [9]
3.4  Godelian Arguments (Lucas) [23]
3.5  Philosophy of Connectionism [40]
3.6  Foundations of Connectionism (more empirical) [10]
3.7  Connectionism & Structured Representation (Fodor/Pylyshyn) [10]
3.8  Foundations of AI (somewhat empirical) [14]
3.9  Computation and Semantics [12]
3.10 The Frame Problem  [10]
3.11 Analog and Digital Processing [5]
3.12 Levels of Analysis (Marr, etc) [7]
3.13 Philosophy of AI, Misc [15]

4.   Miscellaneous Topics [142]

4.1  Colour, General [15]
4.2  Colour Incompatibilities [6]
4.3  Split Brains [11]
4.4  Personal Identity (tiny selection) [7]
4.5  Pain and Pleasure [13]
4.6  Dreaming [9]
4.7  Phenomenal Qualities and the Sorites Paradox [7]
4.8  Mental Images (Pylyshyn, Kosslyn) [21]
4.9  Sensation and Perception, Misc [8]
4.10 Emotions, etc [6]
4.11 Free Will (tiny selection) [7]
4.12 Animal Cognition [7]
4.13 Brains in Vats (Putnam) [14]
4.14 Rationality [11]