concepts

[Harlan Sexton]

I think that we may be talking about the same thing using slightly
different language.

Obviously what a neuron computes can't be legitimately considered a
"concept", but I had intended to convey the idea that what the totality of
them compute was the concept. In other words, what it means to say that
something has a given color can be defined operationally without regard to
introspection of an individual (in other words, we don't need to depend on
a definition of just one person or on access (which is currently
unavailable) to internal states of mind of a collection of people). My
contention is that it is possible (only in principle at the moment, and of
course I may be wrong) to construct a machine that is operationally
equivalent to a person as far as "green" is concerned. Of such a machine I
would then say that it understood the concept of green.

I know form a much simple class of problems how the interconnections and
protocols of processors can allow a network of really simple things to do
much more complex computations, and I even "understand" in a sense how this
works for these cases. What I don't understand is how this could be
extended to sorts of AI problems that neuro-computers are aimed at,
but I believe that it is knowable.


--Harlan