TRs available
Paul Smolensky
pauls at boulder.Colorado.EDU
Sun Aug 14 13:55:21 EDT 1988
Three technical reports are available; please direct requests via e-mail to
kate at boulder.colorado.edu
or via regular mail to:
Paul Smolensky
Department of Computer Science
University of Colorado
Boulder, CO 80309-0430
Thanks -- paul
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Analyzing a connectionist model
as a system of soft rules
Clayton McMillan & Paul Smolensky
CU-CS-393-88 March, 1988
In this paper we reexamine the knowledge in the Rumelhart and
McClelland (1986) connectionist model of the acquisition of the
English past tense. We show that their original connection ma-
trix is approximately equivalent to one that can be explicitly
decomposed into what we call soft rule matrices. Each soft rule
matrix encodes the knowledge of how to handle the verbs in one of
the verb classes determined for this task by Bybee & Slobin
(1982). This demonstrates one approximate but explicit sense in
which it is reasonable to speak of the weights in connectionist
networks encoding higher-level rules or schemas that operate in
parallel. Our results also suggest that it may be feasible to
understand the knowledge in connectionist networks at a level in-
termediate between the microscopic level of individual connec-
tions and the monolithic level of the entire connection matrix.
To appear in the
Proceedings of the Tenth Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society
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The constituent structure
of connectionist mental states:
A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn
Paul Smolensky
CU-CS-394-88 March, 1988
The primary purpose of this article is to reply to the central
point of Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) critique of connectionism.
The direct reply to their critique comprises Section 2 of this
paper. I argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn are simply mistaken in
their claim that connectionist mental states lack the necessary
constituent structure, and that the basis of this mistake is a
failure to appreciate the significance of distributed representa-
tions in connectionist models. Section 3 is a broader response
to the bottom line of their critique, which is that connection-
ists should re-orient their work towards implementation of the
classical symbolic cognitive architecture. I argue instead that
connectionist research should develop new formalizations of the
fundamental computational notions that have been given one par-
ticular formal shape in the traditional symbolic paradigm. My
response to Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique presumes a certain
meta-theoretical context that is laid out in Section 1. In this
first section I argue that any discussion of the choice of some
framework for cognitive modeling (e.g. the connectionist frame-
work) must admit that such a choice embodies a response to a fun-
damental cognitive paradox, and that this response shapes the en-
tire scientific enterprise surrounding research within that
framework. Fodor and Pylyshyn are implicitly advocating one
class of response to the paradox over another, their critique is
analyzed in this light.
In the Southern Journal of Philosophy, special issue on
Connectionism and the Foundations of Cognitive Science
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Application of the Interactive Activation Model
to Document Retrieval
Jonathan Bein & Paul Smolensky
CU-CS-405-88 May 1988
In this paper we consider an application of the Interactive Ac-
tivation Model [McClelland 82] to the problem of document re-
trieval. The issues in this application center around a neural
net or "connectionist" model called inductive information Re-
trieval set forth in [Mozer 84]. The paper provides empirical
results on the robustness of this model using a real-world docu-
ment database consisting of 13,000 documents.
To appear in the
Proceedings of NeuroNimes: Neural Networks and their Applications
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