<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra">Hi Richard,</div><div class="gmail_extra"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">> I can tell you that the quantum story isn't nearly enough clear in the minds of physicists, yet, so how it can be applied to the C question is beyond me. Frankly, it does NOT apply: saying anything about observers and entanglement does not at any point touch the kind of statements that involve talk about qualia etc.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">I'm not sure I see the argument you're trying to make here. If you have an outcome measure that you agree correlates with consciousness, then we have a framework for scientifically studying it. </div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">Here's my setup: If you create a society of models and do not expose them to a corpus containing consciousness philosophy and they then, in a reasonably short amount of time, independently rewrite it, they are almost certainly conscious. This design explicitly rules out a generative model that accidentally spits out consciousness philosophy.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">Another approach is to accept that our brains are so similar that you and I are almost certainly both conscious, and to then perform experiments on each other and study our subjective reports.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">Another approach is to perform experiments on your own brain and to write first person reports about your experience.</div><div class="gmail_extra"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">
These three approaches each have tradeoffs, and each provide unique information. The first approach, in particular, might ultimately allow us to draw some of the strongest possible conclusions. For example, it allows for the scientific study of the extent to which quantum effects may or may not be relevant.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">I'm very interested in hearing any counterarguments as to why this general approach won't work. If it <i>can't</i> work, then I would argue that perhaps we should not create full models of ourselves, but should instead focus on upgrading ourselves. From that perspective, getting this to work is extremely important, despite however futuristic it may seem.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">> <span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px">So let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).</span></div><div class="gmail_extra">
<span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px"><br></span></div><div class="gmail_extra"><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.727272033691406px">Not gonna' happen. :)</span></div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">Brian Mingus</div><div class="gmail_extra"><a href="http://grey.colorado.edu" target="_blank">http://grey.colorado.edu</a></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">
On Tue, Jan 28, 2014 at 7:32 AM, Richard Loosemore <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:rloosemore@susaro.com" target="_blank">rloosemore@susaro.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
On 1/27/14, 11:30 PM, Brian J Mingus wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
Consciousness is also such a bag of worms that we can't rule out that qualia owes its totally non-obvious and a priori unpredicted existence to concepts derived from quantum mechanics, such as nested observers, or entanglement.<br>
<br>
As far as I know, my litmus test for a model is the only way to tell whether low-level quantum effects are required: if the model, which has not been exposed to a corpus containing consciousness philosophy, then goes on to independently recreate consciousness philosophy, despite the fact that it is composed of (for example) point neurons, then we can be sure that low-level quantum mechanical details are not important.<br>
<br>
Note, however, that such a model might still rely on nested observers or entanglement. I'll let a quantum physicist chime in on that - although I will note that according to news articles I've read that we keep managing to entangle larger and larger objects - up to the size of molecules at this time, IIRC.<br>
<br>
<br>
Brian Mingus<br>
<a href="http://grey.colorado.edu/mingus" target="_blank">http://grey.colorado.edu/<u></u>mingus</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
Speaking as someone is both a physicist and a cognitive scientist, AND someone who has written papers resolving that whole C-word issue, I can tell you that the quantum story isn't nearly enough clear in the minds of physicists, yet, so how it can be applied to the C question is beyond me. Frankly, it does NOT apply: saying anything about observers and entanglement does not at any point touch the kind of statements that involve talk about qualia etc. So let's let that sleeping dog lie.... (?).<br>
<br>
As for using the methods/standards of physics over here in cog sci ..... I think it best to listen to George Bernard Shaw on this one: "Never do unto others as you would they do unto you: their tastes may not be the same."<br>
<br>
Our tastes (requirements/constraints/<u></u>issues) are quite different, so what happens elsewhere cannot be directly, slavishly imported.<br>
<br>
<br>
Richard Loosemore<br>
<br>
Wells College<br>
Aurora NY<br>
USA<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>