[AI Seminar] AI Lunch -- Hadi Hosseini -- November 1

Ellen Vitercik vitercik at cs.cmu.edu
Wed Oct 26 17:26:25 EDT 2016


Hi all,

We look forward to seeing you this Tuesday, November 1st, at noon in NSH
3305 for AI lunch. To learn more about the seminar and lunch, please visit
the AI Lunch webpage <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~aiseminar/>.

On Tuesday, Hadi Hosseini <https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~h5hossei/> will give a
talk titled "Analyzing and Designing Truthful Matching Mechanisms."

*Abstract:* The problem of allocating indivisible goods to a set of
self-interested agents in the absence of transferable utilities (such as
money) is omnipresent in various resource allocation settings such as
assigning shifts to nurses, dormitory rooms to students, and members to
subcommittees. These settings leverage techniques from computer science and
economics to ensure fairness and efficiency while preventing agents from
manipulating the outcomes.

In the first part of this talk, I will focus on two widely-studied
randomized matching mechanisms for fair allocation of indivisible goods
under ordinal preferences, namely Random Serial Dictatorship and
Probabilistic Serial rule.  I will give an overview of their properties and
discuss how empirical results can provide deeper insights into theoretical
guarantees, addressing the question of which mechanism to adopt in practice.

In the second part, I will focus on sequential matching with dynamic
ordinal preferences. I will briefly describe a novel model based on a
generic stochastic decision process and show that, in contrast to static
settings, traditional approaches are highly susceptible to manipulation in
dynamic settings. I will describe how we can restore some of the desired
properties by careful consideration of the history of outcomes and how this
history-dependent approach impacts efficiency and fairness.

This talk is based on joint work with Kate Larson and Robin Cohen.
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